Abortion (early thoughts)
Suppose that a woman — after taking every precaution to avoid pregnancy because she does not want to be pregnant — becomes pregnant anyway. Is this woman under a duty to see the pregnancy to term without terminating it? If so, what is the extent of that duty? If not, why not?
When a situation as described in the prompt arises, one has to take into account several factors to decide what course of action must be taken. In addition to the duty of the woman to see the pregnancy to term, one also needs to consider the right of the woman over her bodily autonomy and the potential right of the fetus to live, so as to reach a logical conclusion. One also has to obtain facts relating to the pregnancy(example: the age of the fetus when the pregnancy was detected, if the sexual intercourse that led to the pregnancy was consensual) in order to build a more logical argument.
Firstly, consider the duty of the woman to see the pregnancy to term, irrespective of the other two factors. The duty of the woman then is limited to that of a fictitious one since there is no claim of a right by the fetus. In this case, there is an absence of the potential right of the fetus. If the woman still feels it is her duty to see the pregnancy to term is a simplified example of a person who believes, rightly or wrongly, that they must do something for another person (in this case, the fetus) in excess of what that person can appropriately demand of her (Feinberg 245). Thus, the sense of duty stems from the woman’s belief.
In the same scenario where only the duty of the woman is concerned, another possible claim would be that the fetus deserves to be born. But when a person is said to deserve something good from us what is meant in part is that there would be a certain propriety in our giving that good thing to him in virtue of the kind of person he is, perhaps, or more likely, in virtue of some specific thing he has done (Feinberg 245). The propriety in this case is weak since the woman can never find out what kind of person the fetus will grow up to be. However, a morally sensitive woman might find that it is appropriate of her to see the pregnancy to term (Feinberg 246). Like the employee who cannot demand a reward in addition to the due, but will accept the reward with gratitude, the fetus cannot demand to be born and has to accept the decision of the woman. Therefore, the duty of the woman is a perceived one.
When the woman’s right to bodily autonomy and the fetus’ potential right to life are taken into account, there are multiple other scenarios that may arise in the same case. For example, in the early phase of the pregnancy both the woman and the fetus could be considered a single entity as the zygote would not even have developed into a fetus at that point and the right to bodily autonomy outweighs the potential right of the child. It is claiming that gives rights their special moral significance. This feature of rights is connected in a way with the customary rhetoric about what it is to be a human being. Having rights enables us to “stand up like men,” to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of anyone (Feinberg 252). The zygote, in the early phase, would not even have developed into a fetus, making its very existence as a human being(Feinberg’s species criterion in “Abortion”) doubtful. In addition, the zygote is not conscious, does not have an awareness of itself, is not capable of experiencing emotions, cannot reason and acquire understanding among other common characteristics of a human being. The woman, therefore, is at liberty with respect to the zygote and the liberty is the ground of other people’s duties to grant her the right to bodily autonomy (Feinberg 249).
In some cases, the wellbeing of the woman is connected with the pregnancy. Complications arise during pregnancy compromising her health. The Violinist thought experiment (Feinberg) could be appropriate to determine the course of action in such a scenario. In such a case, the Violinist connected to one’s body in the experiment will not just die when disconnected from one’s body, but upon the completion of his blood purification, one will definitely die. The sense of duty in seeing the pregnancy to term is weaker in such scenarios as the woman’s own right to life is concerned. This right is more stringent than the potential right to life of the fetus. The dilemma would be whether the infringement of the potential right is “a non-wrongful infringement of a right” or “a wrongful, but excusable, infringement of a right.” Since, the very sense of duty to see the pregnancy to term is subjective to the woman and it is not the case that woman ought not have taken the decision, the infringement is a non-wrongful one and the magnitude of the potential right to life is less than that of the right to life of the woman(Thomson 48). Hence, the woman may (not that she should) take the baby’s life if necessary to save her own, that it is morally permissible, even if it is not morally obligatory, to do so.
In other cases, the pregnancy is detected in later phases when the woman might start observing change in her body. After the first couple of months, the fetus will start growing at a fast pace, essentially approaching the species criterion. In such cases, the perceived duty to see the pregnancy to term would be stronger. As the fetus grows in size and develops into a human infant, the potential right to life of the fetus becomes more stringent. The growth also weakens the claim-right of bodily autonomy of the woman as the fetus starts to occupy a singular identity rather than a collective identity with the mother. Then the potential right to life of the infant outweighs the right to life of the woman as well as the right to bodily autonomy. There would be more good in the world if the latter two rights are infringed to safeguard the other right(Thomson 46). It is no more morally permissible to kill the fetus unless it poses risk to the woman’s life.
Therefore, the duty of the woman to see the pregnancy to term is subjective to the moral beliefs of the woman and dependent on the right to life of the woman, the potential right to life of the child and the right to bodily autonomy of the woman. Factors such the age of the fetus and the possibility of complications need to be considered in order to decide which of the three rights can be morally infringed without violation of the rights.
